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We study uniform price auctions using a dataset which includes individual bidders' 
demand schedules in Finnish Treasury auctions during the period 1992-99. Average 
underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may 
result from monopsonistic market power. We develop and test robust implications from 
this theory and ¯nd that it has little support in the data. For example, bidders' individual 
demand functions do not respond to increased competition in the manner predicted by 
the theory. We also present evidence that the Finnish Treasury acts strategically, taking 
into account the fact that the auctions are part of a repeated game between the Treasury 
and the primary dealers. Empirically, the main driver behind bidder behavior and 
underpricing is the volatility of bond returns. Since there is no evidence that bidders are 
risk averse, this suggests that private information and the winner's curse may play an 
important role in these auctions.  
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We study individual bidders’ actual demand schedules in 206 Finnish Treasury auctions
conducted over the time period 1992-99. The auctions are carried out under the uniform
price format, where all bidders pay the stop-out price for the units they are awarded. Since
1998, this has also been the standard format of U.S. Treasury auctions. Participation in the
Finnish auctions is limited to the primary dealers, who vary in number between ﬂve and
ten. The small number of bidders makes these auctions a suitable environment to study
strategic behavior. We examine the main drivers behind bidding strategies and auction
performance with particular attention devoted to whether bidders in these uniform price
auctions have market power as in the imperfect competition models of Wilson (1979), Back
and Zender (1993), and Kyle (1989). We also address strategic seller behavior in light of
the fact that these auctions are part of a repeated game between the Treasury and the
primary dealers.
The performance of treasury auctions is often gauged by the spread between the yield
paid by winners in the auction and a comparable secondary market or when-issued yield
(Cammack, 1991). In uniform auctions in the U.S., this spread tends to be a fraction of
a basis point [Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), Malvey and Archibald (1998)]. This is also
what we ﬂnd in Finland where, translated to price, the auctioned securities are underpriced
by .041% of face value. While this is a small number per unit, the large volumes imply
that the underpricing amounts to a signiﬂcant proﬂt for the bidders and a corresponding
cost to the seller.
Previous work on discriminatory treasury auctions by Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundare-
san (2002) and Bj¿nnes (2001) identiﬂes the volatility of bond returns as the variable which
has the most signiﬂcant economic impact on bidder behavior and underpricing. These pa-
pers ﬂnd that when volatility increases the typical bidder tends to reduce the average price
at which he bids, reduce his total demand, and increase the dispersion of his bids. As a
result, underpricing is found to be increasing in volatility. Since auction size has hardly
any impact on behavior or underpricing, it appears that the importance of volatility has
little to do with bidders being risk averse. Instead, the evidence suggests that the domi-
nating element behind the observed behavior and underpricing is that bidders have private
information and adjust rationally for the winner’s curse/champion’s plague.1
A crucial distinction between these papers and ours is that whereas they study dis-
criminatory auctions, we study uniform auctions. This is important because the theory of
uniform auctions is very diﬁerent from that of discriminatory auctions. In particular, in
the uniform auction model of Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993), bidders disperse
and shade their bids and underpricing arises even though bidders are risk neutral, have
a common and constant marginal valuation of the auctioned asset, and do not possess
private information.2 This is a result of monopsonistic market power which arises endoge-
1In multiunit contexts, Ausubel (1997) has suggested the terminology \champion’s plague" instead of
the winner’s curse, to re￿ect that the more units a bidder wins, the worse news it is.
2 Back and Zender (1993) develop their basic argument under the assumption that bidders have private
information which they do not use. The point is to show that underpricing equilibria from market
power are possible also when bidders are privately informed. Wilson (1979) provides an example with
private information where the stop-out price is perfectly revealing, but underpricing still occurs because
1nously in equilibrium. What happens is that when all the other bidders submit downward
sloping demand schedules, the remaining bidder faces an upward sloping residual supply
curve over which he is a monopsonist. The bidder optimally exercises his monopsonistic
market power by submitting a downward sloping demand schedule himself, thus cementing
the equilibrium and pushing the stop-out price below the \true value" of the securities.
This monopsonistic market power theory is sometimes cited as a serious disadvantage of
the uniform format as compared with the discriminatory format, particularly since the
underpricing can be arbitrarily large.
Our dataset aﬁords us with the unique opportunity of testing this market power the-
ory, and this is one of the main objectives of our paper. Furthermore, by comparing our
results on bidder behavior and underpricing with those of Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundare-
san (2002) we can say something about how uniform and discriminatory treasury auctions
compare from an empirical perspective.
While the Wilson/Back and Zender model admits a plethora of equilibria, there is a
unique class of equilibria which are robust to supply uncertainty (Back and Zender, 1993).
In our empirical tests, we will focus on these, since supply uncertainty is an important
feature of Finnish Treasury auctions. We will also test the implications of a related model
by Kyle (1989), where risk averse bidders enjoy market power. We look at both the linear
equilibrium presented by Kyle as well as the nonlinear equilibria found by Wang and
Zender (2002).3
We develop a new methodology to test the theory. While the theory that we seek to test
is developed in the context of \smooth" demand schedules, in practice bidders submit ﬂnite
collections of price-quantity pairs as bids. This makes it di–cult to compare the theoretical
demand schedules with those that bidders actually submit. We handle this problem by
computing summary statistics of the theoretical and empirical bid distributions. The
validity of the theory is assessed by testing the predicted summary statistics against the
observed statistics, including checking whether the empirical summary statistics react to
exogenous variables as predicted by the theory.
Using this methodology, we examine the implication from the unique class of supply
uncertainty robust demand schedules in the Wilson/Back and Zender model that the bid
distribution exhibits negative skewness which decreases with the number of bidders. This
is also a property of the nonlinear equilibria in Kyle’s (1989) model found by Wang and
Zender (2002), while Kyle’s linear equilibrium predicts zero skewness. We ﬂnd that the
distribution of bids within the empirical demand schedules tends to be negatively skewed
when there are few bidders (5-8), but that skewness becomes signiﬂcantly positive when
of monopsonistic market power.
3Kyle (1989) is predominantly occupied with the question of information aggregation under imperfect
competition in a noisy limit order market with privately informed risk averse players who can both buy and
sell. Strictly speaking, his model is therefore not one of a multiunit auction, where bidders can only buy.
Furthermore, private information is in the focus. However, if we strip the private information away and let
the noisy supply have positive expected value, Kyle’s model becomes one where risk averse bidders choose
demand schedules as strategies in an analogous way to the Wilson/Back-Zender model where bidders are
risk neutral. This version of his model (which Kyle also solves) is applicable to multiunit auctions. See
Section 4. We wish to emphasize that when we refer to \testing Kyle (1989)" we refer to this version of
his model where players do not have private information.
2the number of bidders increases (9-10), i.e., bidders respond to competitive pressure by
submitting a few bids which are much higher than the other bids. We interpret this
behavior as evidence against the theory. Moreover, contrary to what the market power
theory predicts, we ﬂnd that bid shading and underpricing do not decrease with the number
of bidders. However, since we also ﬂnd that demand per bidder is increasing in the number
of bidders, it is possible that bidders exercise some market power, albeit less than suggested
by the theory.
In our sample, the variable that has the most signiﬂcant economic impact on bidder
behavior and underpricing across auctions is volatility,j u s ta sp r e v i o u sr e s e a r c hh a sd o c -
umented for discriminatory auctions. Moreover, we also ﬂnd that an increase in volatility
tends to lead to more bid shading and underpricing, reduced demand, and increased dis-
persion. We ﬂnd no evidence that the importance of volatility is driven by risk aversion. It
seems that primary dealers in the Treasury market have su–cient risk management tools
to act as approximately risk neutral. The evidence thus points to private information and
the winner’s curse as being the key driver behind bidder behavior in uniform treasury
auctions, just as it appears to be in discriminatory treasury auctions.
A special feature of the Finnish auctions is that the seller determines supply after
observing the bids. There is no pre-announced reservation price. Thus the seller may also
be strategic. We document that the Finnish Treasury never chooses supply to maximize
revenue given the bids in an auction. Indeed, in 6 cases, the Treasury cancelled the auctions
because bids were not deemed to be su–ciently high. This behavior suggests that the seller
thinks of the auction as a repeated game, where the bids in subsequent auctions can be
in￿uenced by rejecting revenue increasing bids in the current auction. The way bidders
respond to this may be an important contributing factor to why the monopsonistic market
power theories do not perform so well.
Our paper extends the empirical literature on uniform price auctions. Umlauf (1993)
studies Treasury auctions in Mexico and concludes that a change from the discriminatory-
price format to the uniform price format had the eﬁect of enhancing competition and
reducing bidder proﬂts. Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) and Malvey and Archibald (1998)
ﬂnd that in U.S. Treasury auctions in the 1990’s, uniform auctions had, if anything, less
underpricing than discriminatory auctions. Feldman and Reinhardt (1996) show that the
aggregate demand curve in IMF gold auctions in the 1970’s shifted up under uniform
auctions compared with discriminatory auctions. Scalia (1999) studies bidder behavior
in uniform price auctions in Italy, but do not test any of the theories of uniform price
auctions. Compared to previous studies our data set is unusually clean: i) The number
of bidders is small and observable without error, ii) non-serious, outlier bids are virtually
absent, and iii) transactions data from the secondary market allow us to estimate auction
underpricing with higher precision than in studies which must rely on indicative bid quotes.
For example, Cammack (1991) must rely on aggregate demand and supply statistics to
estimate the number of bidders, and Scalia (1999) has to separate between large and small
bidders among a total of 60 bidders per auction. The small number of bidders in our data
set also distinguishes our paper from Kandel, Sarig, and Wohl (1999), who study IPO
auctions in Israel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Finnish Treasury market is described
3in Section 2 and the data in Section 3. The theory of strategic bidding in uniform price
auctions is surveyed in Section 4 with an emphasis on drawing out empirical predictions.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. We describe the actual demand curves and show
how their characteristics vary with volatility, the number of bidders, and expected auction
size. Section 6 describes the strategic behavior of the seller and Section 7 oﬁers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Finnish Treasury Bond Market
The Finnish Treasury started issuing securities in 1991 and stopped in 1999. The selling
activity during this time period re￿ects the ﬂnancing needs of the Government budget
deﬂcit. The top panel in Figure 1 shows that the budget deﬂcit was very large during the
recession in the early 1990s, when GDP growth was negative, but turned into a surplus
towards the end of the decade. As a result, the Finnish Treasury has been buying back
securities since 2000. The middle panel shows the annual number of Treasury bond auc-
tions (darker columns to the left) and the number of occasions when the Treasury oﬁers
additional securities for sale by ﬂxed price tender (lighter columns to the right). The fre-
quency of auctions is approximately evenly distributed over time except in the beginning
and the end of the period. The total number of auctions is 232 and the number of ﬂxed
price tenders 48.4 Finally, the bottom panel shows monthly average auction size. The
plot shows that average auction size increases, and gets more volatile, towards the end of
the period. Auction size is nominal, but in￿ation is only 10% over the entire period and
averages to 1.2% per year.
The Treasury announces a preliminary auction schedule twice a year. Regular auctions
are held every second Thursday, when one or two Treasury bonds are sold at the same
time. Our data set contains 232 auctions which are spread out over 204 calendar days,
176 days with a single security for sale, and 28 days with two securities. The 232 auctions
include 13 ﬂrst issues of a new security and 219 reopenings of existing securities which are
traded in the secondary market. All Treasury bonds are non-callable bonds with annual
coupon payments and between 2 to 15 years to maturity.
One week before the auction, the Treasury announces which securities will be oﬁered
for sale, but the actual amount for sale is not announced. Instead, supply is determined
after observing the bids. From 1998, the Treasury announces the maximum amount. The
auction format is sealed, multiple bid, and uniform price. Bids are submitted by phone and
conﬂrmed by fax no later than 1 p.m. on the auction day. Individual bids are expressed
in price per 100 markka face value. Any number of price-quantity bids is allowed, but
individual bids must be separated by two decimals ending with 0 or 5 before May 1998
and an even number (0, 2, 4, 6, or 8) after this date. The coarse bid grid is to avoid reading
errors from the fax prints. There is no o–cial quantity multiple, but the smallest bid size
observed in the data set is for 1 million of face value. Awarded bidders pay the stop-out
4In addition, the Treasury sells T-bills which are discount securities with up to one year to maturity.
Sometimes, the Treasury retains T-bonds which the primary dealers can borrow if they have problems
with meeting physical delivery. Finally, when old T-bonds mature, the Treasury redeems the old bonds















































































Figure 1: Finnish Government Budget Deﬂcit and Treasury Bond Auctions
1990-2000. Top panel: Annual Net Balance of the Finnish government budget. Middle
panel: Annual number of Treasury bond auctions along with the number of ﬂxed price
tender. Bottom panel: Monthly average auction size. An approximate exchange rate is 1
USD for 6 FIM.
5price which is the price of the lowest awarded bid. The auction awards are announced half
an hour later at 1:30 p.m. When additional securities are oﬁered for sale by ﬂxed price
tender (see Figure 1), bidders who are awarded in the auction get the right to purchase
the next day additional securities up to 30% of the auction awards at the auction stop-out
price or higher.
Before August 1992, investors could bid directly in the auctions. During this period,
the realization of the number of bidders per auction varies from 1 to 14. In August 1992,
the Treasury designed a primary dealer system, where a few large banks were given the
privilege, but also the obligation, to bid in the auctions. The primary dealers are six
domestic banks, ﬂve foreign banks, and two domestic brokerage ﬂrms. In this system,
investors who want to purchase securities in the auction must bid through one of the
primary dealers. As can be seen in Figure 2, the number of primary dealers has increased

















Figure 2: Number of Primary Dealers: Per auction from August 1992 to 1999.
In sum, there are two distinct characteristics of the Finnish Treasury bond auctions: i)
The number of bidders is small, and ii) supply is determined after the seller has observed
the bids. The Finnish auctions also diﬁer from US Treasury auctions in three other ways:
iii) There is no procedure for non-competitive bids at the stop-out price, iv) there is no
limitation on how much can be awarded to a single primary dealer (no 35%-rule), and v)
there is no when-issued market as the security is usually traded in the secondary market.
5For a more detailed description of the Finnish Treasury bond market, see Keloharju et al. (2002).
63D a t a
3.1 Bid Distribution Data
For this study, the Finnish Treasury has produced a tape which contains all the bids in 231
of the 232 auctions. The last auction is missing. Each row of the tape displays the price
per 100 markka face value, the yield to maturity, the face value demanded at that price,
and a two-digit dealer code. The code remains constant within the auction and across
auctions. The tape contains the demand schedules submitted by 28 diﬁerent bidders of
which 13 are primary dealers. The total number of demand schedules is 1,893, and the
number of price-quantity pairs 5,163. We shall focus on the 206 auctions under the primary
dealer system when the number of bidders is ﬂxed prior to each auction. This reduces the
number of demand schedules to 1,702 and the number of price-quantity pairs to 4,583.6
The distribution of the number of bids per demand schedule can be seen in Figure 3. The




















Figure 3: Distribution of Number of Bids Per Demand Schedule
6One outlying bid is excluded from our data set. This bid is the lower in a demand schedule of two
bids, it is submitted at a price which is more than 6 percentage points below the higher bid, and for a
quantity which exceeds the total auction awards. With so much weight on the lower of the two bids, the
bid distribution exhibits positive skewness. See below in Section 4.3 for a deﬂnition of skewness.
73.2 Secondary Market Prices
This section describes the secondary market and the available price data. Secondary
market prices are required for estimating bid shading and underpricing.
The secondary market for a new security opens immediately after the ﬂrst auction.
When the activity in the secondary market trading gets su–ciently high, a committee
which consists of the Treasury and the primary dealers designates the security as a bench-
mark bond. The primary dealers are obliged to report all their transactions in benchmark
bonds to the Bank of Finland, and they must also post bid and ask quotes. Usually, the
dealers start posting quotes some time before the benchmark designation. The bond loses
its benchmark status one year before maturity.
Time-series of daily bid quotes are provided by the Bank of Finland, which collects the
average primary dealer quote at 1 p.m. The time-series cover 181 of the 206 auctions. The
missing data are from the ﬂrst few auctions of each security before dealers start posting
quotes. Time-series of daily transactions data are also provided by the Bank of Finland.
The transactions data are organized as i) purchases from customers, ii) sales to customers,
and iii) purchases from other primary dealers. For each category, the Bank of Finland
computes the equally-weighted average yield and aggregate trading volume. The next day
the Bank of Finland releases to market participants the average yield across dealers and
the aggregate trading volume. The time-series cover 153 of the 206 auctions. We shall
construct secondary market prices from the bid quotes and use the transactions data to



























Figure 4: Quoted Bid-Ask Spread: Diﬁerence between the quoted bid and the ask yield
by the largest primary dealer (Nordea).
8T h eq u o t e db i d - a s ks p r e a dc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e4 . T h es p r e a di sc o n s t a n to v e re x -
tended time periods and does not respond to daily changes in market conditions. Posted
quotes are binding for 10 million, but this is a small amount compared to average daily
trading volume which is about 450 million per bond, so the posted quotes are best inter-
preted as indicative.
On average, transaction yields are biased towards the bid quote. This can be seen by
comparing the bid and ask quotes with the transaction yields. We pool the time-series and
cross-section data and employ the 7,058 daily observations from August 1992 to April 1999
for which we have complete bid and ask quotes as well as transaction yields for purchases
and sales to customers. Figure 5 reports the averages of three basic yield spreads: i) the
bid quote minus the buy yield (1.01 bp); ii) the eﬁective spread, i.e. the buy yield minus
the sales yield (1.17 bp); and iii) the sales yield minus the ask quote (1.82 bp). The
average quoted spread equals the sum of these spreads (4.00 bp). Clearly, the transaction










=2 :18 (dealer’s markup)
=4 :00 (quoted spread)
Figure 5: Transaction Yields and Posted Quotes: Bid and ask are the posted quotes
at 1 p.m., and buy and sell are the average daily transaction yields for purchases and sales
to customers. This is based on the pooled data set of 7,058 daily observations from August
1992 to April 1999. The numbers are expressed in basis points.
This bias suggests that a reasonable approximation of the market interest rate at the
time of the auction would be the bid quote minus an adjustment for the general level of
transactions yields relative to the bid quote itself. We therefore compute a fourth spread,
namely the bid quote minus the transaction sell yield. We refer to this spread as the
dealer’s markup (2.18 bp), since it re￿ects a markup of the price dealers get from cus-
tomers relative to the inter-dealer bid quote. The idea behind computing the markup
based upon customers’ sell yield is that dealers buy in the auction to sell in the secondary
market. Table 1 shows that the dealers’ markup varies with the size of the quoted spread.7
7We abstain from more sophisticated modelling of the markup, for example, using lags and volatility
9Therefore, we estimate secondary market prices using the conditional markup. For exam-
ple, if the posted bid quote is 5% and the quoted spread 2 bp, we infer the transaction yield
to be 5 ¡ :0094 = 4:9906%. While this means that we are measuring secondary market
prices with error, we believe the error is reduced relative to relying on the bid quote or the
midpoint of the spread. When bid quotes are missing, the observation is dropped from
our data set. We do not attempt to extrapolate the missing secondary market yields from
t h es p a r s et e r ms t r u c t u r ed a t ai nF i n l a n d .
Q u o t e ds p r e a d 2b p 3b p 5b p 1 0b p
Markup (bp) 0.94 1.74 3.14 3.84
Standard error (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.22)
Table 1: Q u o t e dS p r e a d sa n dM a r k u p s :The markup is deﬂned as the average diﬁer-
ence between the bid quote at 1 p.m. and the average daily yield for sales to customers.
The estimates are obtained from a dummy variable regression on the pooled data set of
7,058 daily observations from August 1992 to April 1999.
4 Theory of Bidder Behavior in Uniform Auctions
In uniform auctions, bidders compete by submitting collections of bids, or demand sched-
ules, with awards allocated in the order of descending price until supply is exhausted.
Moreover, winning bidders pay the stop-out price (the price of the lowest winning bid)
for all units they are awarded, regardless of the price at which they submitted their bids.
Hence, the uniform auction works much like a classical Walrasian market with the price
and allocations being determined by the point where demand equals supply. The diﬁer-
ence is that bidders in uniform auctions may submit their demand schedules strategically.
This makes the study of uniform price auctions quite rich, even in the absence of private
information. In particular, bidders can use their monopsonistic market power over the
residual supply to submit demand schedules that generate an equilibrium price below the
Walrasian price. Below we review this market power theory, with an emphasis on drawing
out testable empirical implications. We consider in turn the cases that bidders are risk
neutral and that they are risk averse.
4.1 Market Power when Bidders are Risk Neutral
The case of risk neutral bidders was ﬂrst explored by Wilson (1979) and later by Back and
Zender (1993) who introduce supply uncertainty. In their model, there are N identical
bidders, each of whom can buy the entire auction. The auction size, Q,m a yb er a n d o m
to forecast the markup on a daily basis. One reason is that the autocorrelation in the time-series is only
.08, so there is little to gain from using lags. Another reason is that the transactions data are incomplete
as a result of no trading and missing in about 11% of the trading days. The missing data would give rise
to other estimation problems.
10and is at most Qmax. Bidders have identical valuations of „ v per unit. One can think of „ v as
the expected secondary market price.8 Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993) show
that there are numerous equilibria where bidders submit decreasing demand functions
which result in underpricing, i.e. a stop-out price below „ v.
The intuition behind the underpricing lies with the price-quantity tradeoﬁ faced by
each bidder when all the other N ¡ 1 bidders submit decreasing demand functions. In
this case, a bidder can increase his share of the auction by submitting a higher demand
function, but this comes at the expense of raising the stop-out price and thereby decreasing
the proﬂt per unit he buys. For a given stop-out price, the quantity a bidder receives is
the residual supply { the quantity left over after other bidders’ demand has been ﬂlled.9
So each bidder is essentially maximizing his proﬂt against an increasing residual supply
curve, much like a monopsonist. The underpricing equilibria are cemented by the fact
that each bidder can optimally exercise his monopsonistic market power by submitting a
decreasing demand function.
When the auction size is known, the ﬂrst order condition of a bidder’s price-quantity
tradeoﬁ needs to be satisﬂed only at the stop-out price itself. As a result, there are
numerous underpricing equilibria. However, when supply is uncertain and exogenous,
the ﬂrst order condition must be satisﬂed along the set of all possible stop-out prices.
As a result, there is a unique class of supply uncertainty robust demand functions, as
found by Back and Zender (1993). We shall focus on these equilibria, since bidders in the
Finnish auctions do not know the supply when they submit their bids. The unique supply









where a ‚ Qmax=N is the quantity demanded at a price of 0 and Qmax is the largest








Under (1), demand at a price of zero is not boundless; it is a, while demand is zero at
prices of „ v and higher. For N ‚ 3, the demand schedule exhibits strict concavity,a s
illustrated in Figure 6. The intuition for this is also related to the price-quantity tradeoﬁ
faced by bidders: Given that the stop-out price is below „ v, each bidder would appear
to have an incentive to bid more aggressively to get a bigger share of the auction. So
it must be that a large increase in quantity can only be achieved by a large increase
in price. Furthermore, it must be that a small decrease in price will result in a large
decrease in quantity; since otherwise bidders would have an incentive to be more passive.
This is essentially a convexity condition on the residual supply and therefore a concavity
8In our exposition of the Wilson/Back and Zender model, the bidders are assumed to have no private
information about the secondary market price. See footnote 2.
9In the underpricing equilibria, demand functions are strictly decreasing so rationing is not an issue.













Figure 6: Inverse Demand Curves Under Risk Neutrality: Back and Zender (1993)
inverse demand curves with ﬂve and ten bidders, respectively. The ﬂgure assumes that
„ v =1 ,Qmax = 100 and a =2 0 .T h er e s e r v a t i o np r i c ei sz e r o .
condition on individual demand functions, especially since this must be satisﬂed along the
continuum of possible stop-out prices [see Nyborg (2002) for further discussion]. Figure 6
also illustrates that concavity increases with N. This eﬁect arises because as more bidders
enter the auction, competition reduces the scope to exercise market power and so demand
functions shift up. We show below how this crucial feature of the market power equilibria
translates into a testable empirical prediction, even if a were to vary with N.








where Q is the realized auction size. Total revenue from the auction is thus p0Q and
depends upon „ v, a, N,a n dQ.
The theory does not specify the parameter a. The seller’s preferred equilibrium arises
when a = 1 which implies that demand curves are inﬂnitely elastic and there is no
underpricing (p0 =„ v). This contrasts with the bidders’ preferred equilibrium where a =
Qmax=N. In this case, the seller would be giving away the securities for free if the auction
size were Qmax. The seller can reduce the extent of possible underpricing by imposing a
reservation price r>0. However, during the sample period, the Finnish Treasury never
operated with pre-announced reservation prices.
Back and Zender (2001) show that the seller can reduce equilibrium underpricing by
choosing the supply ex post to maximize revenue. If the seller behaves this way, in equilib-
12rium bidders submit demand functions such that revenue is maximized at Qmax and the














Hence, with ten bidders, which is the maximum in our dataset, underpricing can be as
l a r g ea s1 0 % .T h i si sm u c hm o r et h a na n y t h i n gw eo b s e r v e .
4.2 Market Power when Bidders are Risk Averse
4.2.1 CARA Utility and Linear Equilibria
Kyle (1989) presents a model where bidders have CARA utility with risk aversion co-
e–cient ‰. The post-auction value of the auctioned security, ~ v, is normally distributed
with expectation „ v and variance ￿2. We shall focus on the special case of his model where
bidders do not have private information and thereby emphasize the implications of monop-
sonistic market power and risk bearing. Kyle (1989) demonstrates that there is a unique




¶ „ v ¡ p
‰￿2 : (4)








To isolate the eﬁect of market power from the eﬁect of risk aversion, we can compare (4)
to the corresponding Marshallian (or non-strategic) demand schedule under CARA utility.
Standard arguments show that the Marshallian schedule is the linear function
q(p)=
„ v ¡ p
‰￿2 ; (6)
with inverse
p(q)=„ v ¡ ‰￿
2q: (7)
The negative slope is a result of risk aversion, and linearity is a result of CARA utility and
normality. The strategic inverse demand schedule (5) is located below the Marshallian
inverse (7), as illustrated in Figure 7 for N =5 ,N =1 0 ,a n d„ v =1 . A sN goes to
inﬂnity, the strategic equilibrium converges to the non-strategic one. As in the case of risk
neutral bidders, this illustrates that a feature of supply uncertainty robust equilibria is
that market power diminishes when N increases and eventually vanishes in the limit.
10If the seller is willing/able to sell an inﬂnite amount, McAdams (1999) argues that underpricing from
market power could be eliminated by the \maximize ex post revenue" rule.
11Note that Kyle (1989) considers the case that „ v = 0, but it is straightforward to extend his analysis














Figure 7: Inverse, Linear Demand Curves under CARA Utility: Graphs of Kyle’s
(1989) inverse demand curve with ﬂve bidders, ten bidders, and the corresponding inverse
Marshallian demand curve. We let „ v =1 ,a n d‰￿2 = :05. The reservation price is zero.
Under the strategic demand schedule, (4), the stop-out price is:






Under the non-strategic schedule, (6), it is




These formulas show that underpricing, „ v¡p0, is larger when bidders are strategic. Further-
more, underpricing increases with the risk aversion coe–cient and the amount of aggregate
risk, ￿2Q, that must be borne by a given number of bidders. An increase in N reduces
underpricing primarily because more bidders share the aggregate risk, but also because
market power is reduced.
4.2.2 CARA Utility and Nonlinear Equilibria
A surprising result is that Kyle’s (1989) equilibrium does not converge to that of Back
and Zender (1993) as the risk aversion coe–cient goes to zero. The reason for this can be
















Figure 8: Non-Linear Inverse Demand Curves under CARA Utility:G r a p h s
of Wang and Zender’s (2002) general solution to Kyle’s (1989) model (without private
information). The graphs illustrate the role of changing volatility. We let „ v =1 ,N =5 ,
r =0 ,a =2 0 ,￿ = 0 (no volatility), ‰￿2 = :015 (medium volatility) and ‰￿2 = :05 (high
volatility). As we go from no to high volatility, the curves change shape from concave to
convex. \Medium" volatility corresponds to the case that the demand function is linear.

















where a is an arbitrary positive constant. These equilibria have the intuitive property
that as ‰ goes to zero, they converge to Back and Zender’s equilibria (2). This also shows
that the ﬂrst term in (10) is a pure re￿ection of market power. The second term can be
interpreted as a discount related to risk bearing.
The parameter a plays an important role. As long as a • „ v
‰￿2, (10) is strictly de-
creasing and p(a) = 0; i.e., demand at a price of 0 equals a,a si nB a c ka n dZ e n d e r ’ s
equilibrium. If a = N¡2
N¡1
„ v
‰￿2, (10) reduces to Kyle’s linear equilibrium. So by imposing
linearity, Kyle (1989) is essentially restricting the parameter a to move in a very speciﬂc
w a yi nr e l a t i o nt oN and ￿2. A test of the empirical validity of (5) is therefore a test of
this relation. The general solution of Wang and Zender admits a richer response of bidder
behavior to changes in both N and ￿2.
Keeping a ﬂxed, the eﬁects of changing volatility in (10) are illustrated in Figure 8.
The concave demand curve has ￿2 = 0 and is the same as Back and Zender’s equilibrium,
12We provide a straightforward derivation of (10) in Appendix 1.
15(2). As we increase volatility and risk bearing becomes more important, demand curves
become less concave. Eventually, when ￿2 hits N¡2
N¡1
„ v
‰a, the demand curve becomes linear.
When volatility goes beyond this threshold, demand curves become convex, as shown in
the ﬂgure. These volatility eﬁects generate additional empirical predictions which are not
present in Back and Zender (1993) and Kyle (1989).
4.3 Empirical Implications
In this section, we derive testable implications from the theories presented above. A con-
trast between theory and practice is that whereas the theory assumes that bidders submit
\smooth" demand schedules, in practice, bidders submit collections of price-quantity pairs,
implying that observed demand schedules are step-functions (see Figure 3). The theoreti-
cal demand schedules should therefore be viewed only as approximations. Furthermore, in
our sample, there is variation in auction size and „ v from auction to auction and there is also
variation in the number of bids submitted by individual bidders within an auction. There-
fore, instead of trying to ﬂt discrete empirical demand schedules to the smooth theoretical
schedules, our approach is to compute a number of summary statistics of the predicted
demand schedules and of auction performance which are straightforward to compare with
what we see in the data.
We look at four measures of bidder behavior. The ﬂrst is the discount,w h i c hm e a s u r e s
the diﬁerence between the expected secondary market price and the quantity weighted
average price of a bidder’s demand schedule. Formally, we deﬂne the discount of demand
schedule q(p)t ob e






where p(x) is the inverse demand schedule, r ‚ 0 is the reservation price of the seller, and
„ p is the quantity weighted average price along the inverse demand schedule for prices at or
above the seller’s reservation price. Note that „ p is deﬂned by the last term in (11). This is
the appropriate deﬂnition since q(r), being the demand at the reservation price, is also the
total demand of a bidder who uses q(p). The discount is similar to, but not the same as
underpricing, which is deﬂned as the diﬁerence between the secondary market price and
the auction stop-out price, „ v ¡ p0.
The other three summary statistics are the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis
of the inverse demand schedule. The standard deviation of bids along the schedule is:
st.dev · · =




(p(x) ¡ „ p)2dx; (12)














(p(x) ¡ „ p)
4dx; (14)
16Table 2 summarizes the predicted values of these four statistics along with quantity
demanded, expected underpricing, and award concentration (see below) for i) Back and
Zender’s (1993) supply uncertainty robust equilibrium, ii) Kyle’s (1989) linear equilibrium
in his model under CARA utility, and iii) the corresponding Marshallian demand schedules.
Statistics for Wang and Zender’s (2002) general solution to Kyle’s (1989) model are so long
and complex that they would not ﬂt in the table (see Appendix 2).13
Back and Zendera Kyleb Non-Strategicc
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Table 2: Measures of Bidder Behavior and Auction Performance in Monopson-
istic Market Power Models
a. Back and Zender (1993) column uses (2). Model based on risk neutrality and strategic behavior.
b. Kyle (1989) column uses (5). Model based on CARA utility, normal distribution, strategic behavior.
c. Non-Strategic column uses (7). Model based on CARA utility and normal distribution.
d. Underpricing is measured as „ v ¡ p0,w h e r ep0 is the stop-out price and assumes that the reservation
price is not binding. Otherwise, underpricing would equal „ v ¡ r.
e. Award concentration is the modiﬂed Herﬂndahl index, H⁄, given by (15).
For the Back and Zender equilibrium, Table 2 reveals the striking result that the
unknown parameter a does not ﬂgure in the expressions for the discounts or any of the
higher order moments. Furthermore, skewness, kurtosis, and the ratio of the discount to
the standard deviation, which equals
p
2N ¡ 1=(N ¡ 1), depend only on N. Hence these
13 Note that in the theory the smallest possible equilibrium stop-out price is pmin = p(Qmax=N), where
p(q)i sg i v e nb ye . g .( 2 ) . S of o rq>Q max=N, the functional form of p(q) is irrelevant and could be
anything. However, there is no reason to expect that bidders submit bids which have no chance of getting
awarded. Consequently, the formulas in Table 2 ignore such irrelevant demand. One can view r in the
formulas as being the maximum of the actual reservation price and pmin.
17predictions are valid in a cross-section of auctions, even though a, „ v,a n dr m a yv a r yf r o m
auction to auction. We think the intuition for the surprising result that the unknown
parameter a drops out relates to the fact that the ﬂrst order condition of a bidders’ price-
quantity tradeoﬁ must be satisﬂed at every point along a supply uncertainty robust demand
function. Speciﬂcally, Table 2 shows that the strict concavity of (2) implies that the bid
distribution has negative skewness. Moreover, taking the derivative of the expression for
s k e w n e s s ,w es e et h a ts k e w n e s sg e t sm o r en e g a t i v ea st h en u m b e ro fb i d d e r si n c r e a s e s ,
even if a were to vary systematically with N.
In some of the other comparative statics we can compute from Table 2 for the Back
and Zender equilibrium, a and r do not drop out. For example, the discount and the
standard deviation decrease with the number of bidders, keeping r ﬂxed. The same holds
for underpricing, if we also ﬂx a and assume that the reservation price is not binding. Given
a and r, quantity demanded increases with the number of bidders. In short, additional
bidders induces more aggressive bidding, as a result of diminishing market power. This
assumes that r and a do not vary with N in such a way as to oﬁset this eﬁect.
The Kyle equilibrium and its non-strategic counterpart oﬁer the surprising result that
the discount and the higher order moments do not depend on volatility, even though bid-
ders are risk averse. There are three parameter free tests: Skewness and kurtosis are
constants as a result of linearity, and the ratio of the discount to the standard deviation
equals
p
3. All the action in these models appears to be in the quantity demanded. If
bidders act non-strategically and risk bearing is their only concern (fourth column), quan-
tity demanded decreases with volatility, but does not respond to changes in the number
of bidders or expected auction size. If bidders act strategically (third column), quantity
demanded increases with the number of bidders, which is the distinguishing qualitative
feature between the two models. The comparative static results of the Kyle model depend
critically on linearity, which, as shown in Section 4.2.2, implicitly imposes a constraint on
the unknown parameter a.
While volatility has little impact on bidder behavior in Back and Zender’s and Kyle’s
equilibria, volatility plays a signiﬂcant role in Wang and Zender’s equilibrium (10). When
demand curves are strictly downward-sloping, i.e. a • „ v=‰￿2, and the number of bidders
varies between ﬂve and ten, one can show that bidders respond to an increase in volatil-
ity by lowering their bids (larger discounts) and increasing skewness, which turns from
negative to positive as volatility gets very high (see Appendix 2 and also Figure 8). As a
consequence of this behavior, underpricing increases with volatility. Bidders’ response to
an increase in the number of bidders is the same as in Back and Zender, (2).
Finally, we are interested in examining award concentration. With symmetric bidders
and no private information, each bidder receives an equal share of the awards, which
means that the Herﬂndahl index equals 1=N. However, in our sample, the number of
players varies over time. Hence, the Herﬂndahl index may give the wrong impression of
award concentration. For example, if there are ﬂve bidders and one bidder gets all the
awards, the Herﬂndahl index equals 1, which is also the case when one bidder gets all the
awards in an auction with ten bidders. However, intuitively, the latter case involves more
award concentration relative to the benchmark of equal awards to all bidders. To capture
18this, we employ a modiﬂed version of the Herﬂndahl index deﬂned as
H
⁄ = H £ N: (15)
This measure equals 1 if bidders submit identical demand schedules, as in the models
reviewed above. It is N if one bidder obtains all the awards.
5 Empirical Analysis: Bidder Behavior and Auction
Performance
This section examines the extent to which the theories reviewed above are consistent with
observed bidder behavior and auction performance. There are ﬂve main measures of bidder
behavior: discount, quantity demanded,a n dintra-bidder standard deviation, skewness and
kurtosis; and three measures of auction performance: underpricing, realized auction size,
and award concentration. We examine how these endogenous variables vary with the
following three exogenous variables: volatility, the number of bidders,a n dexpected auction
size. This allows us to test the qualitative performance of the theories. We also carry out
some quantitative tests as well as a detailed examination of the non-linearities that are
apparent in bidders’ demand schedules.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides auction day summary statistics of the exogenous variables in Panel (a)
and the endogenous variables in Panels (b)-(d). The 1,702 demand schedules are submitted
in 206 auctions on 175 auction days. For each auction, we compute the equally-weighted
average of all variables and, then, for each auction day, the equally-weighted average across
the auctions (which are all held simultaneously). This procedure is a conservative way to
eliminate correlations among the error terms. Hence, we treat each auction day average
as an independent observation.
Panel (a) reports on volatility and the number of bidders. Volatility is measured as the
daily standard deviation of bond returns imposing an ARCH(2) structure on volatility.
The details of the estimation can be found in the Appendix 3. Daily volatility averages
.346%, which is about one third of the volatility of S&P500. The number of bidders equals
the number of primary dealers as shown in Figure 2.
Panel (b) reports on two measures of the location of bids relative to the secondary
market price, discount and underpricing (or proﬂt). To estimate the discount in auction
j, we ﬂrst compute the quantity-weighted average price pij for each bidder i, and then the
equally-weighted average across bidders. The discount is deﬂned as the diﬁerence between
the secondary market price at the time of the auction (see Section 3.2) minus this average.
Underpricing is simply deﬂned as the diﬁerence between the secondary market price and
the auction’s stop-out price. Secondary market prices are available for 159 auction days,
but underpricing can only be estimated for 156 auction days since three cancelled auctions
without a stop-out price are lost. There are two important results: First, the average bid is
submitted .081% below the secondary market price. Second, the auctions are underpriced
19Variable mean std s.e. min max N
a) Exogenous
Volatility 0.346 0.157 0.012 0.110 1.115 175
Number bidders 8 2 0.1 5 10 175
b) Location
Discount 0.081 0.153 0.012 -0.397 0.920 159
Underpricing 0.041 0.144 0.012 -0.783 0.420 156
c) Dispersion
St. deviation 0.065 0.049 0.004 0.003 0.279 175
Skewness -0.009 0.428 0.032 -1.623 0.888 175
Kurtosis 2.907 1.547 0.117 1.000 11.184 175
d) Quantity
Bid quantity 235 194 15 16 1,390 175
Tender volume 2040 1952 148 80 13,903 175
Auction size 1179 850 64 0 4,000 175
Award conc. 2.519 1.258 0.096 1.007 9.000 172
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Auction day averages. The symbol s.e. denotes the
standard error of the mean, and N is the number of observations. Volatility is daily price
standard deviation. Discount and underpricing are the diﬁerence between the secondary
market price and the auction average price and the stop-out price, respectively. Intra-
bidder dispersion, skewness, and kurtosis are quantity-weighted. Bid quantities, total
tender volume, and realized auction size are expressed in million markka face value. Bid
quantity is the quantity demanded by a single bidder, tender volume is the quantity
demanded by all bidders in a given auction, and auction size is the quantity sold. Award
concentration is measured by the modiﬂed Herﬂndahl index (15).
20by .041%. The discount is signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero with a t-statistic of 6.7, and
underpricing with a t-statistic of 3.4. The standard deviation of the discount is large, .153,
so a signiﬂcant fraction of the bids are submitted above the secondary market price. For
example, on one auction day, the average bid is .414% above the secondary market price.
Panel (c) reports on the three measures of intra-bidder dispersion.14 The average intra-
bidder standard deviation is about one ﬂfth of daily volatility. Average skewness is -.009,
which is not statistically diﬁerent from 0 and therefore consistent with Kyle (1989) or
any other linear model. However, the table also shows that skewness varies widely across
auctions. Furthermore, in the pooled sample of individual demand schedules intra-bidder
skewness varies from -8.5 to 7.5, with a standard deviation of 1.17. This provides strong
evidence against linearity at the individual bidder level. Further evidence against linearity
is provided by the average kurtosis of 2.907, which exceeds 1.8 with a t-statistic of 9.5.
Finally, Panel (d) looks at four quantity measures. The ﬂrst row shows that the average
bid is for 235 million markka of face value, and the second row that aggregate demand
averages to about 2 billion. The third row shows that the average quantity sold is about
1 billion per auction, but there is substantial variation across auctions. We also note that
auction size is zero in three auctions when the Treasury rejected all bids. In the last row,
we report the modiﬂed Herﬂndahl index according to (15). The average equals 2.5. This
means that the bidders in our data set are not symmetric ex post.
5.2 Regression Analysis
In this section, we regress the bidding and auction performance variables on the exogenous
variables. The regression results are reported in Table 4. One of the exogenous variables
in these regressions is the expected auction size, since this is necessary to examine the
hypothesis that bidders are risk averse. While it is clear that the expected auction sizes
are linked to the Treasury’s ﬂnancing needs, a problem for us is that auction sizes were
not pre-announced { the Treasury only announced maximum auction sizes after 1998
and never announced minimum auction sizes. Taking the point of view of a bidder, we
therefore estimate expected auction size by the average of the realized sizes of the last
three auctions. While this may be a fairly rough estimate, the major empirical results
are robust to various alternative speciﬂcations, e.g., forecasting the auction size using the
parameters from the size regression reported below. The regressions in Panels (a) and (b)
are weighted with volatility. The three quantity regressions in Panel (c) are adjusted for
ﬂrst-order autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. The regression on
award concentration is estimated with ordinary least squares.
Table 4 shows that volatility is statistically signiﬂcant in all regressions, except for in
the skewness and kurtosis regressions. In contrast, the number of bidders is signiﬂcant
only in the skewness and the quantity regressions. The expected auction size is signiﬂcant
only in the skewness, kurtosis, and quantity regressions. The overall impression from these
14For one-bid demand schedules, we set skewness equal to zero and kurtosis to one. The rationale is as
follows: A single bid can be regarded as the limit as c goes to zero of two bids of identical sizes at prices
b + c and b ¡ c. The standard deviation is c, the third moment is 0, and the fourth moment c4. Hence,
skewness is zero and kurtosis one. In the limit, as c goes to zero, skewness remains zero and kurtosis one.
21Dependent Constant Volatility Number Expected R2 N
variable bidders size
a) Location
Discount -0.037 0.318 0.003 -0.013 0.096 159
(-0.7) (3.8)a (0.5) (-1.0)
Underpricing -0.003 0.215 -0.003 -0.009 0.054 156
(-0.0) (2.4)a (-0.4) (-0.6)
b) Dispersion
St. deviation 0.038 0.161 -0.003 -0.019 0.222 175
(2.2)a (5.9)a (-1.5) (-0.4)
Skewness -0.678 -0.005 0.068 0.101 0.172 175
(-3.6)a (0.0) (3.2)a (2.0)a
Kurtosis 2.374 0.436 -0.021 0.543 0.057 175
(3.2)a (0.4) (-0.2) (2.7)a
c) Quantity
Bid quantity 46 -227 21 0.702 0.296 175
(0.6) (-2.9)a (2.5)a (2.9)a
Tender volume -380 -2089 289 0.713 0.399 175
(-0.5) (-2.9)a (2.9)a (2.7)a
Quantity sold -61 -845 134 0.397 0.419 175
(-0.2) (-2.6)a (3.7)a (4.0)a
Award conc. 1.580 0.388 0.109 -0.063 0.021 172
(2.9)a (0.6) (1.6) (-0.3)
Table 4: Determinants of Bidder Behavior: The bid variables are regressed on volatil-
ity, the number of bidders, and the moving average of realized auction size from the past
three auctions. Auction size is expressed per 1,000 million face value. t-statistics are in
parentheses below, and index a denotes signiﬂcance level 5% or better. Panel (a). Dis-
count and underpricing are the diﬁerence between the secondary market price and the
auction average price and the stop-out price, respectively. Panel (b). Intra-bidder disper-
sion, skewness, and kurtosis are quantity-weighted. Panel (c). Face value per bidder in
million markka, total tender volume, and realized auction size. Award concentration is the
Herﬂndahl index. The regressions in Panels (a) and (b) are estimated with weighted least
squares using volatility as weight, the ﬂrst three regressions in Panel (c) are corrected for
autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, and the regression on award
concentration is estimated with ordinary least squares.
22regressions is that volatility is the primary driver behind bidder behavior and underpricing.
Below we look more closely at the individual regressions and discuss where the equilibria
presented in Section 4 succeed and where they fail.
Panel (a) reports that discounts and underpricing increase signiﬂcantly with volatility
but are unaﬁected by the number of bidders and expected auction size. Furthermore,
volatility also has an economically signiﬂcant impact. We see that a one standard deviation
increase in volatility (.157%) raises the discount by .050% of face value, which is of the same
order of magnitude as the average discount of .081% (Table 3). It also raises underpricing
by .034% of face value, which is very close to the average sample underpricing of .041%.
These magnitudes are close to what has been reported for discriminatory price auctions in
Sweden [Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002)]. The fact that the number of bidders
has no impact on the location of bids is hard to reconcile with the market power theory,
since market power diminishes with the number of bidders. More precisely, the result on
the discount is inconsistent with the equilibria of Back and Zender (1993), (2), and Wang
and Zender (2002), (10), but consistent with that of Kyle (1989), (5). The ﬂnding on
underpricing is inconsistent with all three models. This may be a consequence of how the
Treasury sets the stop-out price, which we study in more detail in Section 6.
Panel (b) contains the regressions on the three intra-bidder dispersion measures. The
skewness regression is of particular interest, since we saw in Section 4 that market power
may manifest itself through skewness. Indeed, the skewness regression is the only non-
quantity regression where the number of bidders has a signiﬂcant impact. Skewness in-
creases by .068 for each extra bidder in the auction and increases by .101 for each billion
in expected auction size. Volatility has no eﬁect. The systematic variation in skewness
as N changes suggests that bidders employ non-linear bidding strategies in response to
increased competition. What is really striking here, however, is the sign of the coe–cient
on N. It is the opposite of the negative eﬁect predicted by Back and Zender’s and Wang
and Zender’s equilibria. It is also inconsistent with Kyle’s equilibrium, which predicts that
there should be no eﬁect.
Panel (b) also shows that intra-bidder standard deviation is increasing in volatility.
Once again, this parallels the ﬂndings of Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002) for
discriminatory treasury auctions in Sweden. In particular, the standard deviation increases
by a signiﬂcant .0161% of face value per .1 percentage point increase in volatility. This
stands at odds with Kyle’s equilibrium, where each risk averse bidder responds to uncer-
tainty by reducing quantity demanded but not by increasing the dispersion of his bids.
There is also no role for volatility in Back and Zender’s equilibrium, since bidders are risk
neutral and do not have private information. However, Wang and Zender’s equilibrium
could generate this result on standard deviation (see Appendix 2).
Panel (c) presents the results of the quantity regressions. In the regression on quantity
bid by individual bidders, we have normalized the expected auction size regressor by
dividing it by the number of bidders. There are four particularly interesting results.
First, the quantity bid decreases with volatility, which is in line with Kyle’s equilibrium.
Second, individual bidders demand more when there are more bidders. For each new bidder
who enters the auction, the typical bidder increases demand by a signiﬂcant 21 million.
This behavior is also consistent with Kyle’s equilibrium. Third, bidders demand more
23when expected auction size increases. The striking thing here is that they do so without
lowering prices,a sc a nb es e e ni nP a n e l( a ) .T h i si sh a r dt or e c o n c i l ew i t ht h eh y p o t h e s i s
that bidders are risk averse. Fourth, award concentration is insensitive to changes in
the exogenous variables. This contrasts with the ﬂndings on discriminatory auctions in
Sweden (Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan, 2002), where award concentration decreases
with volatility. This is a potential advantage of uniform price auctions over discriminatory
auctions, since sellers often have dispersed awards as an auction objective.
The empirical comparative statics from the above regression analysis are summarized
in Table 5. A "+", "¡", or "0" indicates that the regression coe–cient is signiﬂcantly
positive, signiﬂcantly negative, or not signiﬂcant at the 5% level, respectively. The table
also compares the empirical ﬂndings with the theoretical comparative statics from the Back
and Zender and Kyle models. For each model, we mark with boldface if the predicted sign
equals the empirically observed sign and, at the bottom, we report the number of correct
and incorrect predictions.
Table 5 shows that Back-Zender’s model delivers the right comparative statics in only
5 of 16 cases. Notably, the model fails with respect to the impact of the number of bidders.
Most striking is that skewness varies with the number of bidders with the opposite sign in
the data and the theory. Kyle’s (1989) model does better and delivers the right comparative
static result in 10 of 18 cases. Kyle predicts correctly that bid quantity decreases with
volatility, but cannot explain the general importance of volatility. Kyle also predicts
correctly that bid quantity increases with the number of bidders, which is suggestive of
bidders having some market power. Overall, however, our ﬂndings suggest that market
power is not a key factor.
5.3 Structural Tests of Standardized Discounts and Moments
Table 2 above shows that the ratios of the discount to the standard deviation and the
higher order moments are functions of the number of bidders only (Back and Zender
model) or constants (Kyle model). In this section, we test these quantitative implications
by regressing observed values on predicted values:
OBS = ﬁ + ﬂ £ PRED + †:
We test whether the intercept is zero and the slope coe–cient one. The theory in Section 4
does not have a residual, but we can reject the quantitative implications even if we allow
for one.15 The test results are reported in Table 6.
W es t a r tw i t ht h eB a c ka n dZ e n d e r( 1 9 9 3 )m o d e li nP a n e l( a ) .T h ei n t e r c e p ti ss t a -
tistically signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero, and the slope coe–cient is signiﬂcantly diﬁerent
from one in all three regressions. Hence, the model is rejected. In particular, we notice that
15Some errors may arise from the fact that bidders must approximate the continuous demand functions
with discrete price-quantity pairs. However, these errors should be relatively small. The price tick is .05
per cent of face value and the quantity multiple one bond with face value 100 markka. Hence, there are
2,000 price intervals between zero and one, and 200,000 quantity intervals between zero and 200 million
which is the approximate average bid quantity. As a result, bidders should be able to approximate fairly
closely the theoretical demand functions.
24Observed Back-Zendera Kyleb
sign (Risk Neutral) (Risk Averse)
a) Discount
Volatility +0 0
Number 0 ¡ 0
Expected Size 0 00
b) Std deviation
Volatility +0 0
Number 0 ¡ 0
Expected Size 0 00
c) Skewness
Volatility 0 00
Number + ¡ 0




Expected Size +0 0
e) Bid Quantity
Volatility ¡ 0 {
Number + +c +




Expected Size 0? +
Number correct n.a. 51 0
Number incorrect n.a. 11 8
Table 5: Comparative Statics: Summary of regression coe–cients and comparative
statics from two market power equilibria. Correct prediction is marked with boldface.
a. Back and Zender (1993) column uses (2). Model based on risk neutrality.
b. Kyle (1989) column uses (5). Model based on risk aversion. Linear equilibrium.
c. Assuming that r>0. If r = 0, the comparative statics are 0.
? indicates ambiguity, since a may be increasing in Q as suggested by the regression results.
25Dependent Constant Predicted F-value R2 N
variable: ﬁﬂ
(a) Back and Zender (1993)
Discount/st.dev. 3.065 -3.259 9.6 0.028 159
(0.923) (1.529) (0.000)
Skewness -0.543 -0.256 2335.8 0.066 175
(0.156) (0.073) (0.000)
Kurtosis 1.964 0.140 640.6 0.029 175
(0.428) (0.061) (0.000)
(b) Kyle (1989)
Discount/st.dev. -0.607 n.a. n.a. n.a. 159
(0.158)
Skewness -0.009 n.a. n.a. n.a. 175
(0.032)
Kurtosis 1.107 n.a. n.a. n.a. 175
(0.117)
Table 6: Structural Tests: Panel a) Regressions of observed values on predicted values.
The discount-to-standard deviation regression is weighted with the standard deviation.
The other regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares. The F-statistic tests the
joint hypothesis that the constant equals zero and the slope coe–cient equals one. The
numbers below the estimated coe–cients are standard errors, and the numbers below the
F-statistics are p-values. N is the number of observations. Panel b) The average diﬁerence
between observed and predicted values.
26the slope coe–cients of the ﬂrst two regressions are signiﬂcantly negative, which means
that standardized discounts and skewness increase with the number of bidders. Kurtosis
increases with the number of bidders, but by less than the full amount according to theory.
The corresponding results for Kyle (1989) are reported in Panel (b). Since there is
no cross-sectional variation in predicted values, we report the average diﬁerence between
observed and predicted values and test whether this diﬁerence is zero. The diﬁerence is sig-
niﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero for standardized discount and kurtosis, but not for skewness.
The ﬂnding for the discount means that bidders in the Finnish auctions disperse their bids
more than predicted by Kyle (1989). Excess kurtosis means that demand schedules are
not linear which we return to in greater detail in the next section.
5.4 Non-Linearity: Skewness, Kurtosis, and Number of Bidders
In this section, we take a closer look at the nonlinearity of submitted demand functions
and study how skewness and kurtosis vary with the number of bidders. Speciﬂcally, we
show that bidders tend to submit one very low bid when there are few bidders, but that
they drop the low bid and instead submit one very high bid when there are many bidders.
Thus skewness tends to be negative for small N and positive for large N.
We ﬂrst classify bidders’ demand schedules by the number of bids they contain. A
bidder’s set of price-quantity pairs in a generic auction is given by the set f(pk;q k)gm
k=1,
where m is the number of bids and the bids are ordered by p1 >p 2 > ::: > pm: We can
think of a demand schedule with m ‚ 2 as being \discrete-linear" if the bidder’s marginal
demand is the same at every price at which he submits a bid and these prices are spaced
equally. To investigate whether bidders use discrete-linear strategies, we ﬂrst compute the









There are m ¡ 1 price diﬁerences. Under a discrete-linear strategy, d⁄
k = 1. Furthermore,
for any m, under a discrete-linear strategy, skewness is zero. Kurtosis increases in m and
approaches 1.8 from below as m goes to inﬂnity. We refer to the kurtosis predicted by a
discrete-linear strategy as \linear kurtosis", to diﬁerentiate it from the realized kurtosis.
Table 7 contains our ﬂndings. Panel (a) covers the case with few bidders (5-8) and
Panel (b) many bidders (9-10). Within each panel, the upper sub-panel provides the means
of d⁄
k across all demand schedules with m =1 ;:::;8 bids. The lower sub-panel contains
the averages of the intra-bidder standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, linear kurtosis,
and the number of observations.
I nP a n e l( a ) ,w ec a ns e et h a t ,f o ra l lm,t h el o w e s td⁄
k exceeds one. This means that
the last price diﬁerence is larger than the intermediate price diﬁerences. This explains
why skewness is negative and kurtosis higher than predicted by a discrete-linear strategy.
However, in Panel (b), we can see, for all m, that the highest d⁄
k exceeds one, which means
that the ﬂrst price diﬁerence is larger than the intermediate price diﬁerences. Therefore,
skewness turns from negative with few bidders to positive with many bidders. Moreover,
this switching of sign is robust to the number of bids in a demand schedule; skewness is
27(a) Few bidders (5-8)
m =1 m =2 m =3 m =4 m =5 m =6 m =7 m =8
d⁄
1 1.000 0.935 0.989 1.116 0.829 0.947 1.468
d⁄
2 1.065 0.853 0.756 0.786 0.914 0.863
d⁄
3 1.156 0.882 0.890 0.820 1.059
d⁄
4 1.246 1.292 0.825 0.775
d⁄





F-test n.a. n.a. 7a 8a 8a 4a 4a 0.3
Std deviation 0.000 0.055 0.078 0.106 0.157 0.138 0.145 0.277
Skewness 0.000 -0.104 -0.249 -0.174 -0.232 -0.521 -0.874 -0.155
Kurtosis 1.000 2.875 3.214 3.489 3.530 2.773 6.340 4.224
Linear Kurtosis 0 1 1.5 1.64 1.7 1.73 1.75 1.76
N 1 2 0 1 1 56 66 04 01 2 9 3
(b) Many bidders (9-10)
m =1 m =2 m =3 m =4 m =5 m =6 m =7 m =8
d⁄
1 1.000 1.039 1.156 1.402 1.355 1.650 1.744
d⁄
2 0.961 0.899 0.831 0.926 1.068 0.885
d⁄
3 0.955 0.798 0.923 0.745 0.845
d⁄
4 0.970 0.899 0.703 0.678
d⁄





F-test n.a. n.a. 7a 19a 26a 5a 7a 2a
Std deviation 0.000 0.070 0.078 0.099 0.117 0.133 0.175 0.229
Skewness 0.000 0.038 0.105 0.180 0.285 0.347 0.238 0.323
Kurtosis 1.000 3.743 4.081 3.742 4.486 4.693 3.456 4.101
Linear Kurtosis 0 1 1.5 1.64 1.7 1.73 1.75 1.76
N 385 305 258 171 77 38 17 11
Table 7: Intra-Bidder Dispersion, Skewness, and Kurtosis: Demand schedules of
up to eight individual bids. Upper sub-panels: Average standardized price diﬁerences.
Lower sub-Panels: Average intra-bidder standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis. Linear
kurtosis refers to what kurtosis would be if bidders employed discrete-linear strategies. N
is the number of demand schedules. Super index a denotes signiﬂcance level 5% or better.
28consistently negative for 5-8 bidders and consistently positive for 9-10 bidders, regardless
of m. In sum, Table 7 corroborates our earlier ﬂnding that while skewness is zero on the
average, skewness is positively related to the number of bidders. Whatever generates this
behavior, it is inconsistent with the three market power models discussed above.
6 Strategic Seller Behavior
Our ﬂndings thus far suggest that bidders in Finnish Treasury auctions act more com-
petitively than predicted by the monopsonistic market power theory. In this section we
explore the strategic behavior of the seller, with an adjunctive view to see how it might
aﬁect the behavior of bidders. Standard auction theory treats the seller as a non-strategic
agent, who commits to sell a ﬂxed quantity. However, in Treasury auctions in practice, the
seller usually announces a target quantity while reserving the right to withdraw securities
from the auction after observing the bids. For example, the U.S. Treasury \reserves the
right to accept or refuse to recognize any or all bids".16 This provides the seller with some
protection against very low prices and also allows the seller to act strategically. The scope
for strategic behavior by the seller is particularly large in our sample since the Finnish
Treasury did not even announce maximum auction sizes before 1998. Recent theoretical
advances have shown that underpricing can be reduced by, for example, choosing supply
ex post so as to maximize revenue [Back and Zender (2001), McAdams (1999)]. While
this speciﬂc strategy would not change the shape of equilibrium demand functions,17 the
general point is that a strategic choice of supply may help combat market power and
underpricing.
We start by noting that the Finnish Treasury did not have an explicit policy regarding
the choice of quantity and stop-out price. For example, they did not announce a reser-
vation price or a supply curve. Conversations with one Treasury o–cial revealed that,
loosely speaking, their actual choices were in￿uenced by i) the long-term revenue target,
ii) market conditions, iii) the Treasury’s own opinion about the true market price, and
iv) unwillingness to spoil the market by accepting too low bids. This statement allows
for almost any short-term behavior. Below we look at the Treasury’s actual behavior.
Our approach is motivated by the theoretical idea that the seller may wish to choose the
stop-out price based on the revenue it will generate.
6.1 Stop-Out Price and Marginal Revenue Maximization
Figure 9 provides an example of the Treasury’s typical behavior, using the auction held
on 14 October 1993 for a bond maturing in 1996. In this auction, bids were submitted
at 10 diﬁerent price levels. This is close to the average number of price levels across all
auctions, which is 9.4. For each price level, which are ordered from high price (level 1) to
low price (level 10), we compute the total revenue the Treasury could obtain if that price
level would have been chosen as the stop-out price. The ﬂgure depicts the normalized
16See ftp.publicdebt.treas.gov/gsr31cfr356.pdf, x356.33 Reservation of rights.
17See the discussion at the end of Section 4.1.
29revenue curve, where the total revenue for each price level is expressed as a fraction of the






















Figure 9: Normalized Revenue Curve. Auction held on 14 October 1993 of a treasury
bond maturing in 1996. There are ten price levels in this auction, going from high price
(level 1) to low price (level 10). Total revenue for each price level is expressed as a fraction
of the maximum revenue that could be achieved in the auction. The stop-out price is
chosen at the fourth highest price level. Total revenue is maximized at the 10th price
level, and marginal revenue is maximized at the 4th price level.
Figure 9 illustrates four important and general facts. First, revenue is maximized at
the lowest price level. Indeed, in 200 of the 206 auctions, this is the case.18 Second,
the revenue maximizing price level is not picked as the stop-out price, something which
holds true in each and every auction in our sample. So the Treasury does not follow
the strategy studied by Back and Zender (2001) and McAdams (1999). Third, marginal
revenue is maximized at an internal price level (neither the highest nor the lowest price
level). The marginal revenue at level l is deﬂned as the diﬁerence in total revenue that
could be generated at level l and level l ¡ 1. The maximum marginal revenue occurs at
the highest price level in 14 auctions and at the lowest price level in 4 auctions, but is
otherwise, in 188 auctions, located somewhere in the middle. Fourth, the chosen stop-out
price coincides with the price at which marginal revenue is maximized.
To examine the generality of the fourth point, we have computed the normalized total
and marginal revenues for each price level within each auction and then compared these
18In the remaining six auctions, the maximum would be attained at the second lowest bid (ﬂve cases)
or the third lowest bid (one case). These six auctions have in common that the marginal demands at the
lowest price are relatively small. Speciﬂcally, they are (in millions of markka) 1;1;5;10;10;15, and 60.
30with the Treasury’s choice of stop-out price. The results are in Table 8. In the table,
p⁄
0 denotes the price level with the highest marginal revenue, p⁄
¡1 denotes the price level
immediately above, p⁄
1 denotes the price level immediately below, etc. The second column
in the table shows the normalized marginal revenue as an average across all auctions in
our sample, for ﬂve diﬁerent price levels centered around p⁄
0. We see that this average is
36% at the maximal marginal revenue price level, p⁄
0. Given that the average number of
price levels across auctions is 9.4, this illustrates that a typical auction has a price level
where marginal revenue is considerably higher than at other price levels, like price level 4
in Figure 9. One can think of the demand function as exhibiting a kink, or a precipitous
drop, at this price level. Alternatively, one can think of the inverse demand function
as having a large ￿at at this price level.19 The third column contains the key piece of
information; namely how frequently the ﬂve price levels are chosen as the stop-out price.
In particular, we see that p⁄
0 is chosen in 43.8% of the 203 completed auctions (recall that
3 auctions in our sample were cancelled). This illustrates the generality of the ﬂnding in
Figure 9 that the Treasury tends to pick the stop-out price to coincide with the price level
where marginal revenue is at its largest.
Price Average normalized Frequency Frequency among Ave marg rev
Level marginal revenue stop-out rationed auctions if rationed
p⁄
¡2 .085 .049 .000 n.a.
p⁄
¡1 .108 .034 .190 .202
p⁄
0 .360 .438 .571 .457
p⁄
1 .132 .197 .048 .212
p⁄
2 .094 .133 .000 n.a.
N2 0 62 0 3 2 1 2 1
Table 8: Marginal Revenue and Stop-Out Price: For each auction, we identify the
price level with the largest marginal revenue, p⁄
0. The table reports the following statistics
across all auctions for this price level and the two immediately above and below: Average
normalized marginal revenue, frequency chosen as stop-out price, percentage of rationed
auctions with the indicated price level as the stop-out, and the average normalized marginal
revenue across the rationed auctions. There are 206 auctions in total, 203 auctions where
the Treasury sold some bonds, and 21 auctions where the Treasury rationed bids placed
at the stop-out price.
Another interesting feature of the Treasury’s behavior is that it rationed marginal
demand at the stop-out price in 21 auctions. The fourth column in Table 8 answers the
question as to how many of these rationed auctions coincide with a stop-out price around
p⁄
0.W e s e e t h a t p⁄
0 is the stop-out price in 57.1%, or 12, of these auctions. The ﬂfth
column tabulates the average normalized marginal revenue at the ﬂve price levels for the
rationed auctions. Comparing these numbers with those in the second column supports
the view that rationing tends to happen when marginal demand at the stop-out price is
19As one might expect, p⁄
0 tends to be located reasonably close to the quantity weighted average price
of the aggregate demand function. On average, p⁄
0 exceeds the auction mean by .032% of face value.
31high. For p⁄
0, marginal revenue increases from 36.0% in the sample as a whole (second
column) to 45.7% in the sample of rationed auctions (ﬂfth column). This increase is
economically large, but not statistically signiﬂcant due to the small number of observations.
Similarly, at the adjacent price levels average marginal revenue approximately doubles from
an unconditional average of around 10% to 20% when there is rationing.
The choice of the stop-out price as the price at which marginal revenue is maximized
makes intuitive sense when one considers that the Treasury holds a sequence of auctions.
However, what may be surprising is that the Treasury is able to raise the money it needs (to
fund the budget deﬂcit) without going below the maximum marginal revenue point more
frequently. This could be a result of the Treasury exercising outside options to borrow
elsewhere instead of borrowing expensively in the auction. But it could also be that the
Treasury’s marginal revenue maximization policy induces bidders to be more competitive
than suggested by the market power theories. If bidders know that the seller will set the
stop-out price where marginal revenue is at the highest, then a single bidder would have
an incentive to concentrate demand on that price. However, if all bidders concentrate
their demand on the same \consensus" price, rationing will occur. In this case, to avoid
rationing, a bidder might ﬂnd it preferable to concentrate his demand one tick above the
others’ \consensus" price. As a result, price competition would ensue and market power
would break down. In our sample, the average quantity awarded to bids at the stop-out
price is 495 million markka when the stop-out price is the marginal revenue maximizing
price. In contrast, in the market power equilibria we tested above, the marginal quantity
awarded to bids at the stop-out price has zero measure.20 An important part of this
argument is that the Treasury can credibly commit to the marginal revenue maximizing
strategy. It may well be that the fact that the auctions in our sample essentially constitute
a repeated game between the Treasury and the primary dealers plays an important role in
communicating this policy and making it credible.
6.2 Underpricing and Auction Size
Within any given auction, the Finnish Treasury faces a price-quantity tradeoﬁ. However,
in this subsection we show that there is no evidence of such a tradeoﬁ across auctions.
There is no relation between underpricing and realized auction size. When demand is
strong, the Treasury sells more securities, and when demand is weak, it holds back supply.
In this subsection, to control for duration (and therefore indirectly for volatility) eﬁects,
we work with yields rather than prices. But we have also carried out the analysis below
using prices { and reach the same conclusions.
Within each auction, bids are sorted by yield levels which are ordered from the lowest to
the highest yield. For each level i,w ec o m p u t et h ed i ﬁ e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h eb i dy i e l da n dt h e
secondary market yield, ¢Yi. At the stop-out yield, this \markup" represents underpricing
measured in yield space. For each yield level i,w ea l s oc o m p u t et h ea g g r e g a t eq u a n t i t y
20In the discrete version of these equilibria, the marginal quantity equals one quantity multiple,
[Goswami, Noe, and Rebellow (1996), Nyborg (2002)]. The discrete theory is not fully developed when
there is supply uncertainty.
32abcd R2 N
All yields 0.0300 0.0178 -0.0035 -0.0007 0.200 1,388
(15.7)a (9.6)a (-3.1)a (-3.7)a
Stop-out only 0.0064 -0.0005 0.0024 -0.0001 0.014 175
(2.5)a (-0.1) (0.8) (-0.1)
Table 9: Treasury Policy. Regression of yield spread between each auction bid and
the secondary market yield on the deviation between quantity bid at each level and the
quantity expected for the auction. Estimation with ordinary least squares. t-statistics are
below in parentheses with super-index a denoting signiﬂcance level 5% or better.
bid up to this yield, Qi. This is then standardized by the expected auction size:
Xi =
Qi ¡ „ Q
„ Q
:
For each auction, the locus of points (¢Yi;Q i) essentially sketches out the aggregate (stan-
dardized) demand function.
We pool the data across all auctions and estimate a regression function as:





This provides a characterization of the average aggregate demand schedule. A cubic func-
tional form has been chosen because visual inspection shows that the aggregate demand
curve within individual auctions tends to be S-shaped. The independent variable is highly








The regression coe–cients evaluated at the stop-out yield characterize the seller’s policy.
The tradeoﬁ policy says that b>0. The strong no-tradeoﬁ hypothesis says that b = c =
d =0 .
The regression results are reported in Table 9. In the regression using all yields,
the coe–cient b is positive, which means that the aggregate inverse demand schedule
(with yields on the y-axis) is upward sloping. In other words, within an auction, the
Treasury faces a tradeoﬁ between yield and quantity. The estimated values for c and d,
both signiﬂcantly negative, tell us that this tradeoﬁ is nonlinear. This contrasts with the
regression using only the observations at the stop-out yield. Here, only the constant is
signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero.21 This shows that while the auctions are underpriced on
21Lack of cross-section variation in the independent variable could explain why the regression coe–cients
in the smaller stop-out sample are insigniﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero. However, the standard deviation
of Xi is .749 in the stop-out sample compared with 1.505 in the full sample. Hence, there is substantial
variation in the quantity at the stop-out yield, so lack of power does not explain the insigniﬂcant coe–cients
in the stop-out sample.
33the average, across auctions the Treasury is not trading oﬁ underpricing, here measured in
yield, and quantity. In other words, the outcome of the repeated game played between the
Treasury and bidders is to keep the yield markup (underpricing) unaﬁected by quantity
sold. There may be several reasons for this. First, bidders tend to respond to larger
expected auction sizes by increasing quantity demanded without lowering discounts. This
helps the Treasury to sell larger quantities without lowering prices. Second, since the
Treasury tends to pick the price where the marginal demand is the largest as the stop-out
price, it has scope for varying the quantity in an individual auction without changing the
price. A further implication of these points is that when the expected auction size changes,
the price level at which bidders place the largest marginal demand and where marginal
revenue is at its largest, remains the same.
7 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed strategic behavior in uniform price treasury auctions with a small
number of bidders. We have found that the bidders as well as the seller act strategically.
Bidders increase quantity demanded and submit a few very high bids when competition in-
creases, and the seller systematically rejects bids which would have raised revenue. Instead
of choosing a stop-out price and quantity to maximize revenue, the seller systematically
c h o o s e sa sas t o p - o u tp r i c et h ep r i c ea tw h i c hm a r g i n a lr e v e n u ei sm a x i m i z e d .W eh a v ea l s o
derived and tested robust implications from three non-informational models which empha-
size bidders’ monopsonistic market power and, to a smaller extent, risk sharing. The fact
that individual bidders’ demand increases when there are more bidders can be consistent
with monopsonistic market power. However, the ﬂnding that discounts and underpricing
are unaﬁected by the number of bidders (which is exogenous) is not. Moreover, the speciﬂc
equilibria of Back and Zender (1993), Kyle (1989), and Wang and Zender (2002) cannot
explain the observed non-linearities in bidders’ demand schedules. Finally, risk sharing
does not seem to in￿uence bidder behavior. As auction size increases, bidders willingly
purchase larger quantities without lowering the prices at which they bid.
There are several possible reasons why the extant models of monopsonistic market
power are rejected by the data. We want to point out two. First, the models examined
in this paper model the Treasury auction as a one-shot game while the Treasury auc-
tions in our data are repeated. It seems implausible that the Treasury would be willing
to tolerate very low prices in the auction without either disciplining primary dealers or
taking its business elsewhere. Such implicit threats could serve to weaken primary dealers
willingness and ability to coordinate on an underpricing equilibrium. However, repetition
could also work in the opposite direction and enhance bidders’ market power by facilitating
coordination among the bidders, as emphasized in the experimental study by Goswami,
Noe, and Rebello (1996) who ﬂnd that subjects play Back-Zender type equilibria when
they are allowed to communicate before the auction, but not otherwise. Weighing these
views against each other, our evidence suggests that the Treasury’s power to discipline
dealers dominates the eﬁect of dealers’ enhanced ability to coordinate. Studying multiunit
auctions as repeated games between the seller and the buyers seems to be an important
direction for future research.
34Second, we have documented that although the Treasury has no explicit policy with
respect to its choice of stop-out price, it appears to have a policy which can best be
described as a marginal revenue maximization policy. It may well be that this policy creates
incentives for bidders to concentrate their demand around a \consensus" price. In turn,
this may create competition for marginal units and thereby help break the noncompetitive
market power equilibria, along similar lines as in Nyborg’s (2002) analysis of a discretized
uniform price auction. The importance of the repeated games idea in this context is
that it may serve as a mechanism to give credibility to the Treasury’s policy. This possible
interaction between the auctions as repeated games and the eﬁect of discreteness in bidders’
strategy space could be interesting to explore in future research.
With respect to bidder behavior, our strongest empirical ﬂndings relate to the impor-
tance of volatility. Speciﬂcally, when volatility increases, bidders increase bid shading,
reduce quantity demanded, and increase the dispersion of their bids. This is the same
reaction as in Sweden’s discriminatory price Treasury auctions (Nyborg, Rydqvist, and
Sundaresan, 2002). This is noteworthy because monopsonistic market power should not
be a concern in these auctions (Back and Zender, 1993) and there is little evidence that
risk aversion is a signiﬂcant driver of bidder behavior in Sweden either. Our ﬂndings on
volatility appears to be consistent with the view that bidders have private information and
are concerned with the winner’s curse. However, this leaves us with a puzzle as to why
discounts do not increase with the number of bidders. A possible explanation is that the
winner’s curse eﬁect is oﬁset by a market power eﬁect.
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378 Appendix 1: Equilibria in Kyle’s (1989) Model
This appendix shows the derivation of the equilibrium demand schedules in Kyle (1989)
when bidders do not have private information. The approach follows Nyborg (2002).
Suppose that supply Q is known. When all other bidders use q(p), the \ﬂnal" bidder’s
optimization problem can be written (because of CARA utility and normality):
max




2‰(Q ¡ (N ¡ 1)q(p))
2;
where (Q ¡ (N ¡ 1)q(p)) is the residual supply. The ﬂrst order condition is:
¡(Q ¡ (N ¡ 1)q(p)) ¡ (N ¡ 1)(„ v ¡ p)q
0(p)+￿
2‰(Q ¡ (N ¡ 1)q(p))(N ¡ 1)q
0(p)=0 :
Using symmetry and market clearing, Nq(p)=Q, the ﬂrst order condition is:




This is an ordinary diﬁerential equation which is independent of Q. Therefore, the solution
to the diﬁerential equation will work for any Q. There are many possible solutions. To
get Kyle’s solution, posit a linear equilibrium: q(p)=￿ ¡ ￿p.P l u gq0(p)=¡￿ into (16).
We get
q(p)=
(N ¡ 1)(„ v ¡ p)￿




￿2‰(N ¡ 1)￿ +1
= ￿:





Thus we get Kyle’s solution (4).
The general solution to (16) is not known. However, we can obtain the general solution
in inverse form by writing (16) in inverse form as follows:
p
0(q)q ¡ (N ¡ 1)[„ v ¡ p(q)] + (N ¡ 1)￿
2‰q =0 : (17)
The general solution to (17) is Wang and Zender’s (2002) equilibrium (10), where a>0.
Note that the general solution is a polynomial function of order N ¡ 1 and therefore for
N>5, we are unable to ﬂnd a general closed form solution for q(p) .( A si sw e l lk n o w n ,
Abel’s classical theorem shows that there is no general formula for the root of a polynomial
of degree 5 or higher).
389 Appendix 2: Summary Statistics Under Wang and
Zender’s (2002) Equilibrium
In this appendix, we report the summary statistics in Wang and Zender’s (2002) equilib-
rium, (10) for a • „ v=‰￿2. For simplicity, we report the statistics under the assumption
that „ v = 1, which is just a normalization (and will be re￿ected in ￿). For reasons of
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D =9( 1+N)( ¡1+2N);
E =2 4 0( 1+N)( 2+N)( 3+N)( 1+2N)( ¡1+3N)( 6+N (¡5+2N));
F =4 8 0a (2 + N)( 3+N)( 1+2N)( ¡6+N (23 + 2N (¡7+2( ¡1+N) N))) ‰￿
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39Note that this expression for underpricing holds true irrespective of r. Finally, note that
when a • v
‰￿2, quantity demanded at a price of 0 is a. The modiﬂed Herﬂndahl index is 1.
Comparative statics
We have calculated comparative statics of the summary statistics above employing a
combination of analytical and numerical methods, using N 2 [5;10] (as in our data). No
speciﬂc assumptions on ‰ or ￿2 have been made. All comparative statics results are partial
and, as seen in the formulas above, depend on a. We have not computed comparative
statics with respect to Q, since it seems unreasonable that a would be unaﬁected by
auction size.
In summary, the Wang and Zender (2002) model does very well with respect to volatil-
ity. Bidders are predicted to respond to an increase in volatility by increasing discounts,
standard deviation,22 and skewness, and by decreasing quantity demanded. The model
fails only on the the relationship between skewness and volatility. However, like Back
and Zender, it predicts that bidders respond to an increase in the number of bidders by
decreasing discounts, standard deviation, and skewness, and by increasing bid quantity.
Hence, it fails with respect to the number of bidders (except for quantity demanded),
which is the variable at the heart of the imperfect competition story.
22Note the following qualiﬂcations: Under (10), standard deviation increases with ￿2 except when a‰￿2
is \small" relative to „ v; decreases with N except when N =5a n da‰￿2 are \close" to „ v;a n di ti n c r e a s e s
with a except when a‰￿2 is \small" relative to „ v.
4010 Appendix 3: Volatility Estimation
We estimate conditional volatility as an ARCH(2) process of bond returns, which have
been calculated from end-of-day bid quotes. The cross-section and time-series data are
stacked. The level of the coe–cients are about half of those from the Swedish data.
Let Pt be the bond price at time t and A is the one-day accrued interest for a coupon
bond. We assume that bond returns follow a random walk with constant drift a:
Pt ¡ Pt¡1 + A
Pt¡1
= a + et: (23)
The cross-section and time-series data are pooled. The volatility of the error term is as
e
2




t¡2 + `1DURt + ”: (24)
The estimated coe–cients are:
ﬁ0 ﬁ1 ﬁ2 `1
-0.0017 0.2959 0.2784 0.0179
(0.0013) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0005)
When a new security is auctioned, there are no bond prices from the secondary market
before the auction. In those cases, we use the prices of the traded T-bond with dura-
tion that most closely mimics the duration of the new T-bond. When a new T-bond is
auctioned, we use the average winning auction yield to compute duration.
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